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validity. Outside the laboratory attention sweeps broadly across 
extensive territories - landscapes, mountain ranges, panoramas 
of all sorts. Whereas a restricted set of cues may support 
automatized responding, a panorama rarely does. 
Would behavior be affected if consciousness were lacking? 
The plight of the blindsight victim cited by Velmans implies that 
voluntary behavior would grind to a halt. The blindsight patient 
can discriminate between this and that, but under what condi-
tions? When bullied by the experimenter to respond although 
he sees nothing. Left to himself(in life beyond the laboratory) he 
initiates no behavior whatever with respect to information in the 
affected visual half field. Were his difficulty to extend across all 
sensory modalities, he would not voluntarily respond to any-
thing at all. 
When conscious representations are necessary for behavior 
and when they are not (and why) is a matter for debate and 
research. But to sweep consciousness aside as epiphenomenal 
(as irrelevant to behavior as the hiss of escaping steam is to the 
movement of the locomotive) exemplifies a blinkered and exces-
sively focalized vision. 
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Velmans's target article asks whether human information pro-
cessing is conscious. He answers that consciousness is not 
necessary for human information processing of any type to occur 
and that consciousness can play no causal role in any human 
information processing. In spite of his claim, he also concludes 
that consciousness can be studied scientifically and must be to 
achieve a complete psychology. Surely Velmans cannot eat his 
cake and have it, too. A mental entity without functions might 
be interesting to study, but it could not be important to study. 
Perhaps there is something amiss with Velmans's view of the 
relationship between information processing and conscious-
ness. 
Velmans reviews evidence consistent with the conclusion that 
consciousness is not necessary for human information process-
ing stages from input to output, and more strongly, that because 
it receives only the outputs of these stages consciousness can 
never influence them. One might dispute the way Velmans uses 
individual studies to support this argument (e.g., I would 
disagree with his interpretations of Libet, 1985, Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987, and other studies), but I'm sure other commen-
tators will develop this line of attack. My main point is apparent 
if we turn Velmans' s question around and ask, "Is consciousness 
information processing?" The answer is (indeed, unless we 
resort to dualism, must be): Yes, consciousness is a form of 
human (and perhaps nonhuman as well) information processing. 
Although it is not identical to focal attention and primary 
memory, consciousness is closely related to these functions. In 
relation to input processing, a relatively unified conscious per-
ception/ experience is achieved when selective attention func-
tions as a gateway controlling those aspects of the environment 
that are likely to enter awareness, likely to be stored in memory, 
and likely to be responded to. In relation to output processing, 
voluntary behavior is activated by a selective process which 
chooses from amongst competing action patterns (cf. Shallice 
1972) those that are most likely to achieve a consciously experi-
enced goal state. 1 Velmans cites this pretheoretical notion that 
identifies conscious awareness with focal attention and he finds 
reasons (I'm not convinced by the evidence he cites here) for 
rejecting it. Yet Velmans himself fails to reject it completely: "A 
complete dissociation of consciousness from focal-attentive pro-
cessing is difficult to achieve, as the disruption of consciousness 
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is also likely to interfere with at least some aspects of (normal) 
focal-attentive processing." The converse, that disruption of 
focal-attentive processing will disturb consciousness, is also 
true. 
What are the functions of consciousness? Velmans's answer, 
which on evolutionary2 and other grounds I cannot accept, is: 
None. My view is more closely aligned with that of Carr (1979), 
Posner (1980), and Shallice (1972). Shallice (1972), for example, 
identified the functions of consciousness as setting and storing 
goals and selecting from amongst competing action patterns 
(usually to achieve the goal). I would add that consciousness is a 
representational "workshop" that supports activities such as 
decision making, imagination, planning, problem solving, hy-
pothesis testing, the novel use of habitual routines (Rozin 1976), 
and writing this commentary. Velmans points to examples in 
which such complex mental functions (e.g., creative problem 
solving) appear to be performed either without or prior to 
consciousness. Even if one accepts these examples, they fail to 
demonstrate that consciousness does not normally assist in and 
usually expedite such activities. (My toaster is no less a toaster 
because I can toast bread in my fireplace.) 
Discussions of the nature and functions of consciousness 
should distinguish between awareness of ideas, sensations, 
images, movements, actions, and so on, which I refer to as 
consciousness1 and awareness of oneself- or more commonly-
self-awareness, which I refer to as consciousness2 (Puccetti & 
Klein 1980). It is interesting to note that consciousness1 is a 
prerequisite for the development of a self-concept, for self-
awareness, and for other metacognitive functions. The develop-
ment and nature of our individual self-concept is critically 
dependent upon consciousness1. Although there may be learn-
ing without awareness, only conscious experiences (of sensa-
tions, movements, objects, and events) seem to be stored in the 
form of self-referenced, episodic traces. It is primarily these 
traces that make up our "self" concept. Because knowledge of 
oneself can be extrapolated to conspecifics, an individual with 
the capacity for self-awareness would be able to predict the 
behavior of others much more accurately than an individual 
without such a capacity (Humphrey 1984). Thus having self-
consciousness of consciousness2 would confer tremendous se-
lective advantages. 
Can the human mind ever achieve a complete understanding 
of itself? The answer is: "Probably not" (Barresi 1987), but our 
understanding can improve. By generating discussion of the 
concept of consciousness, which I assume is a prerequisite for an 
organism like me to entertain such a question, Velmans' s con-
troversial claims will (even though they are basically wrong) 
help move us in the direction of such improved understanding. 
NOTES 
I. As Attneave (1961) so aptly pointed out, consciousness can access 
input information at varying levels of abstraction ranging from sensory 
attributes to categorical information and the experience of objects and 
events; similarly, conscious or voluntary control of output can be aimed 
at individual muscles or more abstract actions. 
2. If, as Velmans claims, consciousness does not enter into or influ-
ence any human information processing, then it is awfully hard to 
imagine what the adaptive functions of consciousness might be that 
would have conferred a selective advantage leading to its evolution. 
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Velmans recounts many interesting results, though we should 
note that some of the more challenging ones (e.g., those of 
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Lackner & Garrett 1973) seem not to have been studied further, 
whereas others, such as those concerning hypnosis, are contro-
versial. Rather than discuss these in detail we prefer to com-
ment briefly on the 10 points in his summary and then to 
describe our own approach to these difficult problems. 
In brief, then, we agree with items 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 in his 
summary. We do not like the second sentence of item 2. In our 
view what enters awareness is the result of a special process that 
builds on unconscious processing. 
We totally disagree with item 7 since we have constructed a 
plausible model that does not have the problems Vel mans sees. 
It is wise to avoid philosophical conclusions of this type until we 
understand how the brain works. Items 8 and 9 we feel to be 
largely irrelevant at this stage. 
It seems strange to us that when Velmans considers the extent 
to which information processing involves consciousness he ut-
terly neglects the stuff of which brains are made, that is, 
neurons. Cognitive science can no doubt give us important 
insights into this and the related issue of focal attention. A 
definite answer, however, can ultimately be provided only by 
having recourse to the neuronal level. 
How could such a neuronal theory of consciousness or 
awareness be structured? We will give a number of plausible 
suggestions and argue that knowing this answer will go a long 
way toward understanding what processes are or are not con-
scious in human information processing. 
We assume without further ado that awareness exists and is 
somehow expressed at the level of neurons and circuits. Only 
this position takes account of the human subjective experience 
of awareness on the one hand while being compatible with a 
reductionist stance on the other. 
What form could this neuronal correlate of awareness take? 
Several possibilities exist. For an external (or internal) event to 
be perceived, one of at least three possibilities has to be 
satisfied: 
1. A sufficiently large number of neurons somewhere in the 
"brain" (or, more specifically, within the "cortical" system) have 
to be activated. For example, any sensory event that activates 
more than several thousand neurons would lead to awareness of 
that event (Libet 1989). 
2. Special "tagged" or "labeled" neurons have to be activated 
by this event; for example, cortical pyramidal cells in layer VI 
projecting to subcortical targets. 
3. At least two distinct forms of neuronal firing exist, one 
being correlated with awareness and the other not. More specif-
ically, we assume that the desynchronized, random firing of 
neurons can cause their postsynaptic target cells to discharge, 
leading ultimately to some motor response, but without 
awareness. Awareness is associated with a particular type of 
spatiotemporal discharge pattern. We have proposed (Crick & 
Koch 1990; 1991) that awareness is associated with phase-
locked, oscillatory firing behavior in the 35-65-Hz frequency 
range as observed by Gray et al. (1989) in the visual cortex ofthe 
cat. Other possibilities, such as high-frequency bursts (Crick 
1984), also exist. 
These possibilities are not mutually exclusive. Thus, 
awareness may be associated with a sufficient number of neu-
rons in layer VI of cortex firing in synchrony. Furthermore, we 
assume that the neural events associated with awareness acti-
vate short-term memory rather strongly (Crick & Koch 1990). 
Some alterations, however, may be produced by unconscious 
processes, as in priming. 
Once we have established how "what type of firing of what 
types of neurons" correlates with awareness, we can immediate-
ly explain in an unambiguous manner such phenomena as 
blindsight (Cowey & Storig 1991), facial recognition without 
awareness in prosopagnosia (Tranel & Damasio 1985) and other 
processes that bypass awareness. For example, in our frame-
work a visual stimulus in a blindsighted patient would cause 
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neurons in cortical and subcortical structures to fire in a de-
synchronized manner, resulting in the pointing of the hand 
toward the stimulus. Because of the nature of the lesion, how-
ever, this stimulus would not lead to phase-locked neuronal 
oscillations, nor would it activate short-term memory; it would 
therefore not be perceived by the patient. The time for these 
oscillations to become established and phase-locked across cor-
tex could, in principle, explain some of the temporal effects in 
"lexical priming" (Neeley 1977). 
Such a theory, formulated in neuronal terms, would also 
clarifY the function and mode of action offocal attention. A major 
finding of cortical electrophysiology is that while there do exist 
on the order of 30-40 cortical areas (per hemisphere) specializ-
ing in different aspects of visual processing, no area exists which 
corresponds to everything we see (Van Essen et al. 1991). The 
existence of such neurons, coding simultaneously for the posi-
tion, orientation, depth, color, texture, and so on of objects, also 
appears unlikely given the resultant combinatorial explosion. 
Thus, at any given time, a perceived object has to be repre-
sented by the firing of a set of neurons all over the cortex. For 
example, if I am looking at my daughter talking to me, neurons 
in area MT code for the motion of her face, neurons in area V 4 for 
the hue of her face, neurons in primary and higher auditory 
cortices code for her voice, and neurons in the inferior temporal 
lobe may code for the visual template or icon associated with my 
visual concept of my daughter. In what manner is the firing 
activity of this highly dispersed group of neurons, however, 
combined to lead to the unitary subjective concept of my 
daughter speaking to me? And, furthermore, how is this neu-
ronal activity and the associated percept distinguished from the 
activity of neurons responding to the face of my son in the 
background? This problem, faced by any highly distributed 
connectionist system, is known as the binding problem. 
One needs to distinguish at least three types of binding. 
1. A simple cell in visual cortex has its preferred orientation 
always perpendicular to its preferred direction of motion. Thus, 
orientation and direction of motion are combined. Neurons 
throughout cortex seem to compound a number of variables in 
this manner. 
2. A second type of binding is probably acquired by over-
learning. Thus, ecologically important and frequently viewed 
stimuli, such as grandmothers or letters and words, may be 
represented by the firing of small groups of neurons. 
3. Because the capacity of both types of binding is limited, 
however, we need to postulate a third, very rapid and transient 
type of binding mechanism with essentially infinite capacity. It 
is likely that focal attention instantiates this type of binding 
mechanism. 
Specifically, following von der Malsburg and Schneider 
(1986), we suggest that this binding is achieved by all neurons 
that are associated with the perceived object firing in syn-
chrony. Thus, phase-locked oscillations are the cellular ex-
pression of attention. The time to set up this synchronized 
timing activity could - at least in principle- explain phenomena 
such as illusory conjunction (Treisman & Schmidt 1982) and the 
well-known limitation of primary or short-term memory (Crick 
& Koch 1991). Furthermore, such a theory would also explain 
why certain processes can be carried out in parallel, without 
requiring awareness. We simply assume that repeated syn-
chronous activation of groups of neurons responding to a partic-
ular stimulus (e.g., a letter or a face) cause individual neurons or 
small groups of neurons to become directly activated in re-
sponse to this stimulus, on the basis of some Hebbian rule. Such 
a learning mechanism would eventually bypass the need for a 
focal attention mechanism for the perception of such frequently 
viewed stimuli (i.e., transforming a type 3 binding problem into 
a type 2). 
Such a neurobiological theory of awareness and consciousness 
will also help us understand to what extent (and how) anesthetic 
agents render us really "unaware" or "unconscious" (Kulli & 
Koch 1991) and will enable us to manipulate the brain in novel 
ways. 
The more general point, however, is that only a theory of 
awareness formulated in neuronal language will ultimately re-
solve the issues addressed by Velmans in a clear and unam-
biguous manner. We do not wish to slight the accomplishments 
of cognitive science in unraveling the mysteries of the mind. 
Until the advent of routine recordings in the brains of cats and 
primates, psychology was the main source of knowledge about 
such processes. It seems to us, however, that the time is ripe for 
a neurobiological approach to these problems, relating 
awareness and consciousness to neurons and their firing pat-
terns, in other words, for explaining the mind on the basis of the 
brain. 
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Velmans skillfully and clearly reviews the evidence that con-
sciousness (i.e., introspective awareness) is not necessary to 
human information processing of all kinds, including that in-
volved in the control of motor action. I can agree with much of 
that; we have ourselves produced direct experimental evidence 
for that proposition (Libet 1965; 1985; 1987; 1989; Libet et al. 
1991). But Velmans generalizes the argument so as to conclude 
that no human information processing involves consciousness 
entering into or causally influencing the process (sect. 9.1). I 
argue that that more general conclusion goes beyond the evi-
dence and is unwarranted, except as an item of belief. 
In another analysis of the causal status of the conscious mind, 
Velmans introduces the concept of complementarity between 
the first-person and third-person perspective. I agree fully that 
the two perspectives are complementary and mutually irreduc-
ible, in the sense that neither is describable in any a priori 
fashion by the other (Libet 1965; 1966; 1981; 1985; 1987; 1989). 
However, Velmans's extension of that concept to deny that 
consciousness interacts with the brain and his analysis of the 
significance of causality as viewed from each perspective is not 
convincing or perhaps even tenable. I elaborate my position on 
both of these general issues below. 
1. Does consciousness enter Into Input analysis and choice? 
1.1. Neural time factor in identification of and response to signal. 
Experimental evidence has indicated that a substantial period of 
cortical activity, up to about 500 msec or more, is necessary for 
the production and appearance of a conscious sensory experi-
ence (Libet 1966; 1981; 1989; Libet et al. 1979). As we had 
pointed out, the ability to react meaningfully to a stimulus 
within as little as 100 msec clearly suggests that detection, 
processing, and organized decision-making to respond can all 
take place unconsciously, before awareness of the signal has 
developed. A direct confirmation of this was recently carried out 
by Taylor and McCloskey (1990) and was actually already indi-
cated by previous reports (Fehrer & Biederman 1962). These 
investigators showed that when a visual signal was followed by a 
second visual stimulus, which retroactively blanked out any 
reportable awareness of the initial signal, the reaction-time to 
that first signal was the same as that when the signal was given 
alone (with reportable awareness). 
In recent work (Libet et al. 1991) we have shown directly that 
a stimulus to the somatosensory thalamus ofhuman subjects can 
be detected correctly in a forced choice response even when the 
subjects are completely unaware of any stimulus-induced sensa-
tion. This occurred predominantly with stimulus durations of 
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about 250 msec or less. To produce even an uncertain and 
ambivalent report of sensory awareness (with correct detection) 
required a substantially larger stimulus duration (an increase of 
>250 msec) than did correct detection with no awareness. Of 
additional interest is the fact that the subjects were intensely 
focusing their attention on the 1-sec intervals during which they 
were to receive a possible stimulus; yet they did not achieve 
conscious awareness for many of the stimuli that were neverthe-
less correctly detected in their forced choice response. This 
demonstrates that cerebral information processing can be dis-
sociated from awareness of that processing, and that focal atten-
tion and cognitive responses can be separated from the con-
scious feature of a signal, in accord with Velmans's contention 
(sect. 5.1, 8). 
That "It is important to distinguish the contents of con-
sciousness . . . from the processes which encode information" 
(sect. 4.2) had indeed been directly and experimentally demon-
strated by Libet et al. (1979). In this work, crucial tests con-
firmed that the subjective conscious time for a sensory event was 
antedated (referred backwards in time) by up to about 500 msec 
relative to the time for neural production of the sensory 
experience. 
1.2. Conscious voluntary choice to act: conscious causality. 
Velmans (sect. 3) refers to our experimental finding that the 
initiation of a voluntary act appears to develop unconsciously in 
the brain, about 350 msec before the subject is consciously 
aware of the urge or intention to act (Libet 1983; Libet et al. 
1983). This indicted that conscious volition may not be neces-
sary to the initiation of a decision or choice of when to act; to that 
extent it adds evidence for the general argument that the neural 
processes for a volitional choice, as for recognition of a sensory 
stimulus, can be dissociated from the conscious function related 
to these events. 
The experimental evidence, however, does not justify the 
broader conclusion that "no human information processing is 
conscious in (the) sense ... that consciousness enters into or 
causally influences the process" (sect. 9.1). If such a conclusion 
were valid it would indeed have far-reaching theoretical im-
plications, as would the opposite conclusion. But that conclu-
sion would be faulty on at least two grounds. 
First, in the case of voluntary action one should distinguish 
between the initiation of the volitional process and the final 
outcome of it in the actual performance of the act (Libet 1985). 
Although conscious intention appears well after the cerebral 
process starts, it does precede the actual motor act by about 150 
msec. In that final period after the subject has became aware of 
the intention to act, the subject could consciously control the 
outcome of vetoing the intention and not moving at all, or by 
passively or actively promoting its completion. There is no 
experimental evidence that would deny a causal role for a 
conscious control function here, although admittedly there is 
none to demonstrate such a role either. The alternative pos-
sibilities remain viable at the level of philosophical outlook, with 
neither having been experimentally excluded. 
Second, Velmans may be making a leap that is unwarranted in 
principle, from the argument that consciousness is not neces-
sary for the development of many human information processes 
to one that consciousness therefore can have no role in affecting 
these processes. A condition can be a sufficient factor without 
being a necessary one. Furthermore, it may be premature to 
generalize that consciousness is even not necessary for any 
human information processing, although it could be an accept-
able working hypothesis. It should be noted that the argument 
about an active role for consciousness can be independent of that 
about monistic or dualistic theories of the mind-brain rela-
tionship (e. g. , Libet 1985). 
2. Complementarity for first-person versus third-person per-
spectives. I take it that the terms "first-person perspective" and 
"third-person perspective" are equivalent, respectively, to the 
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